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Few issues in late-nineteenth-century Armenian/Turkish history straddle so
many of the “questions” of the period as does the mass conversion of Arme-
nians in the 1890s. The topic is enmeshed in the much-contested “Armenian
Question,” the birth of Armenian nationalism, the so-called “Eastern Ques-
tion,” and the rise of Turkish nationalism. This article will deal with these
conversions by situating them within the larger context of the “Armenian Ques-
tion” generally. Although important research has been done on the mass con-
versions during the genocide of 1915, surprisingly little has focused on the
massacres of 1894–1897. Even more surprising is the lack of research to
date into the issue of mass conversions during the latter period, and nothing
has been written based on Ottoman archives.2 My aim here is to make a
contribution towards ﬁlling this lacuna.
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The last real struggle for the very survival of the Ottoman state before the
outbreak of the Balkan Wars and World War I occurred in Anatolia, which
came to be seen as the last redoubt, particularly after the crushing losses of
the 1877–1878 war against Russia. The Armenian Question also became a sec-
ondary theatre of confrontation between the Great Powers, particularly Britain
and Russia, with Germany and France playing a secondary role. Britain, led by
the Liberal giant Gladstone, took a close interest in the fate of the Ottoman
Armenians, who were seen as “Christians in peril.” The Armenian massacres
actually brought Gladstone out of retirement and enraged him to the point
where he declared that Turkey “deserved to be wiped off the map.” One of
the major inﬂuences on the fate of the Ottoman Armenians was the vexed ques-
tion of “Armenian Reform” in the six vilayets (provinces), which became a
sticking point between the sultan, his government, and the Powers, particularly
the British. The Ottomans saw foreign interest in the reform issue as unaccep-
table interference in their internal affairs. The Sublime Porte also feared this
was a ﬁrst step in securing autonomy and perhaps eventual independence for
the Armenian vilayets. A key source used in this article, in conjunction with
Ottoman archival documents, is the consular correspondence of British
consuls in the massacre zones, particularly that of Vice-Consul Fitzmaurice.3
A major player in the region was Russia, often at odds with its own Armenian
population in the Caucasus, and since the war of 1877 occupying the regions of
Kars and Ardahan, adjacent to the Armenian vilayets of eastern Anatolia. In this
way, the Armenian Question overlapped with the Great Game in Asia.4
Germany became the closest ally of the Ottoman Empire during the reign of
Abdu¨lhamid (1876–1909), but unlike its role in 1915, it played a relatively
minor part in the Armenian Question at this time.5 France took an interest in
the Armenian Question because she could not afford to leave the scene to
Britain. Nonetheless, one of the major sources I use in this article, and set
Yo¨nelik Politikalar (“The Armenian affair has been settled”: Policies directed at Armenians in the
war years according to Ottoman documents) (Istanbul, 2008) is a remarkable contribution since it is
the ﬁrst such work based almost entirely on Ottoman archives. Raymond Ke´vorkian’s Le Genocide
des Armeniens (Paris, 2007) is possibly the most solid and detailed work on the genocide to date. It
makes extensive use of the Istanbul and Jerusalem Patriarchate archives.
3 Philip Magnus, Gladstone: A Biography (London, 1963), 430. The best source on the reform
issue is still Christopher J. Walker’s Armenia: The Survival of a Nation (London, 1991), 11–120.
4 Ron Grigor Suny, Looking toward Ararat: Armenia in Modern History (Bloomington, 1993).
This is by far the best source so far on the fate of the Russian Armenians in Imperial Russia. On the
history of modern-day Soviet Armenia, see Claire Mouradian, L’Arme´nie (Paris, 1995).
5 Margaret Lavinia Anderson, “Down in Turkey Far Away: Human Rights, the Armenian
Massacres, and Orientalism in Wilhelmine Germany,” The Journal of Modern History 79
(2007): 80–111. This fascinating article details how the Zionist leader Theodor Herzl actually
considered propagandizing for Abdu¨lhamid in return for concessions in Palestine.
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against Ottoman archival materials, is the correspondence of the French consul
in Diyarbekir during the massacres, Gustave Meyrier.6
Another critical issue that provides the background for the massacres and the
conversions was the rise of Turkish/Ottoman nationalism. Although it would be
somewhat premature to talk about Turkish nationalism at this time, as it was
understood after the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, there were clearly stir-
rings in that direction among Ottoman ruling circles from the late nineteenth
century. The tenor of the memoirs of Hu¨seyin Nazım Pas¸a, minister of police
during the turbulent 1890s, verges on racism. After the Zeytun uprising in
1895, Nazım Pas¸a is informed that among the documents captured from the
Zeytun rebels is the correspondence of a certain “Little Hasan” (Ku¨c¸u¨k
Hasan), who is mentioned as a Turkish ofﬁcial working for the Armenians
and providing them vital information: “I was particularly distraught to the
point of becoming ill by the thought that a Turk should become the tool of
the committees who were thirsting for Turkish blood,” Nazım Pas¸a writes.
“However, after a thorough investigation, we learned that the said person
was actually an Armenian convert, and by posing as a Turk son of a Turk,
had used the committee for his personal gain. In this way, in keeping with
his nature, he killed two birds with one stone by aiding his people and ﬁlling
his purse.”7
As will be seen, in the issue of ofﬁcial reluctance or unwillingness to crack
down on the culprits of the massacres, there was a very real notion of “us” and
“them”; the former being the Muslims, that is, Turks, Kurds, and others, the
latter being the Armenians. This attitude later became prominent in the leader-
ship of the Young Turks. Ahmed Rıza, “jotted the following in his private note-
book. ‘Christians acquired privileges when they rebelled [and] they desired to
rebel when they acquired privileges.’”8
What do we mean by mass religious conversion? When is conversion volun-
tary and when is it forced? According to Islamic law, conversion to Islam must
be voluntary, and forced conversion is speciﬁcally banned.9 After the Tanzimat
reforms from 1839 onwards, speciﬁc regulations were put in place to ensure
that any conversion to Islam would be carried out “according to established
practice and regulations” (usul ve nizamına tevﬁken). The conversion procedure
was speciﬁcally designed to prove that the act was voluntary. It stipulated that
converts should carry out the procedure in the presence of their next-of-kin and
6 Gustave Meyrier, Les Massacres de Diarbekir: Correspondance diplomatique du Vice-Consul
de France, Presente´e et annote´e par Claire Mouradian et Michel Durand-Meyrier (Paris, 2000).
7 Hu¨seyin Nazım Pas¸a, Hatıralarım: Ermeni Olaylarının I˙c¸yu¨zu¨ (My memoirs: The inside story
of the Armenian incidents) (Istanbul, 2003 [1924]), 258–59.
8 S¸u¨kru¨ Haniog˘lu, Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902–1908 (Oxford, 2001),
40.
9 Selim Deringil “‘There Is No Compulsion in Religion’: Conversion and Apostasy in the Late
Ottoman Empire, 1839–1856,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 40 (2000): 547–75.
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witnesses from their community who would be given the opportunity to dis-
suade them. Converts were also required to be in complete control of their
mental faculties and to have reached the age of discernment (akil ve balig˘).
Also speciﬁed was that the highest-ranking religious authority of the convert’s
confession had to be present to bear witness that the conversion was voluntary;
then and only then would the convert utter the sacred formula (s¸ehadet) and be
given a Muslim name. The new Muslim would also be issued a certiﬁcate from
the local Islamic judge, the kadı, testifying that they had converted on such and
such a date in the presence of witnesses. Only after this elaborate procedure had
been carried out was the person recognized ofﬁcially as a Muslim.10 As will be
seen, in none of the cases of mass conversions of Armenians during the mas-
sacres was this procedure carried out.
A related issue is that of apostasy from Islam. The commonly held belief is
that the punishment for this is death. Closer study reveals a marked reluctance
on the part of the authorities to apply the death penalty. Indeed, after 1844
Sultan Abdu¨lmecid I (r. 1839–1861) banned the ofﬁcial execution of apostates.
This was due partly to foreign pressure, but more to the realization that new
times required new practices.11 We will see that Armenians who took up
Islam during the mass conversions often later returned to their original faith,
depending on local conditions. But apostasy was still seen by the Muslim
general population as a mortal sin, and many an Armenian was deterred
from apostasy by a fear that his Muslim neighbors might well take the law
into their own hands, as in fact often occurred.
The “six provinces” (vilayet-i sitte)—Sıvas, Erzurum, Mamu¨retu¨laziz,
Diyarbekir, Bitlis, and Van—where the great majority of the Ottoman Arme-
nians lived, is the geographical setting for this article’s story.12 According to
the documentation studied by this author, the geographical “climate for conver-
sion” seems to have been most intense in the vilayets of Diyarbekir,
Mamu¨retu¨laziz, and Sivas, although some of the most dramatic cases, such
as the massacres and conversions that occurred at Urfa, lie beyond this geogra-
phy.13 The Armenian revolutionary organizations, the Dashnak and the
Hunchak, had been working hard to enliven nationalist consciousness among
the largely peasant population of these regions, with mixed success. Yet the
Ottoman state—meaning Sultan Abdu¨lhamid II, his bureaucracy, and the
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 The Ottoman administrative grid was a direct adaptation of the French departements of the
Code Napoleon. It consisted of the vilayet (province), kaza (prefecture of sub district), nahiye
(commune), and ko¨y or kır’a (village). There were also districts organized as independent
sancak. On the Ottoman administrative reform, see I˙lber Ortaylı, Tanzimattan Sonra Mahalli I˙dare-
ler (Local administration after the Tanzimat) (Ankara, 1974).
13 I am grateful to an anonymous CSSH reviewer for the suggestion of “the climate of
conversion.”
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Turkish/Kurdish elites in the six provinces—came to see the “Armenian
Committees,” as they were called, as a real threat to their dominant position.
Broadly speaking, this was the political and social context in which occurred
the widespread massacres, mass conversions, and in some cases re-conversions
of the region’s Armenian population.14 Many Armenians converted to Islam
in order to escape death; some later converted back to their former faith,
some did not.
In almost all of the cases of mass conversion the explanation given by
Ottoman ofﬁcials was that the Armenians were converting because “they
feared the Kurds.” Who were these Kurds and how did they come into the
picture? Although I cannot do anything like justice to Kurdish/Ottoman
history here, a brief explanation will contextualize what follows. The
“Kurds” referred to are mostly the nomadic population of eastern Anatolia
that had shared that geography with the Armenians for centuries. Although
the Armenian peasant population had always been subject to a quasi-feudal
oppression at the hands of the Kurdish ag˘as or s¸eyhs (tribal chieftains or
headmen), what has been described as a “benign symbiosis” had nonetheless
existed.15 As Christopher Walker has elegantly phrased it, “Armenians and
Kurds got on with one another tolerably, but not particularly well.”16 Yet,
some Armenians characterized their relationship with the nomadic Kurds as
being that of “brothers of earth and water.”17 Their Kurdish overlords had pro-
vided their Armenian peasantry with a modicum of protection in return for an
unofﬁcial “protection tax” the haﬁr. In the harsh winters of the Anatolian
plateau, Kurdish nomads often shared the hearths of Armenians.18 What set
the two peoples against each other?19 Several factors disrupted this precarious
equilibrium. First, the effects of the centralizing reforms of the mid-nineteenth
century only began to be felt in the six provinces in the 1870s.20 Since the cen-
tralizing reforms, the Armenians of Anatolia had suffered from two main ills:
double taxation and the depredations of the Kurdish tribes. Even after they had
14 On the Armenian revolutionary organizations, the seminal works are still: Louise Nalbandian,
The Armenian Revolutionary Movement (Berkeley, 1963); and Anahide Terminassian, Nationalism
and Socialism in the Armenian Revolutionary Movement (Cambridge Mass., 1984).
15 Suny, Looking toward Ararat, 101.
16 Christopher Walker, Armenia: The Survival of a Nation (Chatham, Kent, 1991), 137. Walker
is still the most detailed study on the massacres of the 1890s.
17 Ibid.
18 Martin Van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State: The Social and Political Structures ofKurdi-
stan (London, 1992), 107.
19 Nalbandian, Armenian Revolutionary Movement, 7. Nalbandian notes that on some occasions
like the 1862 risings in Van and Zeytun, Armenian and Kurdish peasants had fought together
against their oppressors.
20 Janet Klein, Power in the Periphery: The Hamidiye Light Cavalry and the Struggle over
Ottoman Kurdistan, Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 2002, 116.
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paid their taxes to the state, the Kurdish s¸eyhs of the area would demand
further payment.21
The power of the big Kurdish lords, the mir, who controlled vast territories,
was broken by policies of centralization in the second half of the century. By
the 1880s the power of the last great warlord of the region, Bedirhan Bey,
was broken, and intra-tribal feuding recommenced.22 The breaking of war-
lords’ power left a power vacuum in the region that was ﬁlled by “tribes
which had hitherto been kept in check by the mirs.”23 From these tribes the
Hamidiye Light Cavalry was recruited in the early 1890s. The Cavalry were
lower-level tribes organized into Cossack-style irregular units by the Sultan
Abdu¨lhamid II and his entourage.24 The ofﬁcial primary aim of these units
was to quell what the state saw as “the perﬁdious and subversive activities of
the Armenian brigands.”25 The Sultan’s policy was to kill two birds with one
stone—to cow the Armenian population and to secure the loyalty of the
Kurds. In a manner of speaking, the Armenians were to be the bait for
Kurdish obedience and loyalty: “By thus providing paid employment of high
prestige and a virtual license to raid, the sultan hoped to install in the Kurds
a strong loyalty to him personally.”26 These units featured prominently in the
massacres and mass conversions of 1895–1897 organized and led by Zeki
Pas¸a, who later became infamous as the author of the Sasun massacre.27
Yet therewas another, deeper dimension to theHamidian policy regardingAna-
tolia that has been described as the “politics of unity.”28After the disastrous war of
1877–1878 with Russia, which led to the loss of the greater part of the most valu-
able remaining Ottoman lands in the Balkans, the sultan and his entourage feared
that Anatolia, the last stronghold, would go the same way. AnOttoman document
generated at this time clearly drew the parallel: “However, the Armenian affair is
not like theBulgarian or the Serbian affairs, because it has arisen inAnatoliawhich
is the crucible of Ottoman power.”29 This had to be prevented at all costs. In order
to fulﬁll this aim the Anatolian Kurdish population had to be wooed to the side of
21 Vahakn Dadrian, The History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conﬂict from the Balkans to
Anatolia to the Caucasus (Providence, R.I. and Oxford, 1995), 114.
22 Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State, 181–82: “The denser the administrative network of the
state became, the smaller and simpler the tribes.”
23 Klein, Power in the Periphery, 118.
24 Selim Deringil, “Ottoman to Turk: Minority-Majority Relations in the Late Ottoman Empire,”
in Dru Gladney, ed.,Making Majorities: Constituting the Nation in Japan, China, Korea, Malaysia,
Fiji, Turkey and the U.S. (Stanford, 1998), 217–26.
25 Ibid.,” 220.
26 Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State, 186.
27 On Zeki Pas¸a and the Hamidiye Regiments, see Deringil, “Ottoman to Turk,” 222, 223; Brui-
nessen, Agha, Shaikh and State, 187; Klein, Power in the Periphery, 162.
28 Stephen Duguid, “The Politics of Unity: Hamidian Policy in Eastern Anatolia,” Middle
Eastern Studies 9 (1973): 130–55.
29 Bas¸bakanlık Osmanlı Ars¸ivi (Prime Ministry, Ottoman Archives, Istanbul [henceforth BOA])
Y.PRK. 32/94, 3 Sept. 1893.
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what came to be considered as “ofﬁcial Islam.”30 It must also be said that some of
the conditions that the Powers were seeking to impose, such as the foreign
approval for governors in the six provinces, a foreign “high commissioner”
with extensive powers to oversee reforms, and a permanent “Commission of
Control,” were entirely out of order for the ruler of a sovereign state.
Beforewe turn to discussion of the conversions themselves, somemethodologi-
cal considerations are in order concerning the language of Ottoman ofﬁcialdom.
Many of the reports, cipher telegrams, and memoranda used in this article were
meant to be “in house,” destined only for the eyes of a limited number of ofﬁ-
cials.31 Even so, Ottoman ofﬁcialdom spoke elliptically and euphemistically,
and it is precisely this wording that is invaluable as a window on the ofﬁcial
mind. For instance Enis Pas¸a, the vali of Diyarbekir, always referred to Armenian
womenwhoMuslims had abducted and forced to convert to Islam during themas-
sacres as “Armenian women who were dispersed here and there during the trou-
bles” (zaman-ı ig˘tis¸as¸da o¨teye beru¨ye dag˘ılmıs¸ olan Ermeni kadınları), thus
entirely removing the agency of the abductors.32 Similarly, when Minister of
Police Hu¨seyin Nazım Pas¸a referred to “classes of the population who intervened
in the restoration of order” (asayis¸in iadesinde mu¨dahil olan sınıf-u ahali), albeit
as an undesirable event, hemeant themassacringmob.33When the vali (governor)
of Sıvas reported, “Today some two thousand Kurds have killed twenty-three
Armenians. Some ﬁve hundred Christians now want to convert to Islam of their
own free will,” the bland and unquestioning use of “free will” strongly implies
that conversion as a survival tactic came to be seen as “free will” by Ottoman ofﬁ-
cialdom.34Orwhen it is reported, “Themany sticks that are beingmade in the car-
pentry and basket weaver shops in the city [Istanbul] should be conﬁscated and
they should be forbidden to make more,” this can appear quite innocuous to the
untrained eye. Innocuous, that is, until we look at the document’s date, 13Novem-
ber 1896, only a few months after the Kum Kapı massacres of 26 August, when
various sources reported that the massacring mob had borne similar sticks and
cudgels, which some sources contend were issued by the police.35 Ottoman
30 Selim Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the
Late Ottoman Empire 1876–1909 (Oxford and London, 2000), ch. 2.
31 I should note that this is only a sample of documents dealing with the conversions of Arme-
nians and other Christians during this period.
32 BOA A.MKT MHM 637/16, 14 Mart. 1312/27 Mar. 1896, vilayet of Diyarbekir to Sublime
Porte.
33 Hu¨seyin Nazım Pas¸a, Ermeni Olayları Tarihi (The history of the Armenian events) (Ankara,
1998), vol. 1, 94, doc. 45. This is a two-volume compilation of documents selected with the aim of
showing the alleged primary responsibility of the Armenian revolutionary committees in the out-
break of the “troubles.”
34 BOA A.MKT 660/35 4, Tes¸rin-i Sani 1311/17 Nov. 1895, vali of Sivas Halil Pas¸a to Sublime
Porte.
35 BOA Y.A HUS 362/35 31, Tes¸rin-I Evvel 1316/13 Nov. 1896. On the motif of “uniform
sticks,” see Edhem Eldem, “26 Ag˘ustos 1896 ‘Banka Vak’ası’ ve 1896 ‘Ermeni Olayları’” (The
Ottoman Bank incident of 26 August and the 1896 Armenian incidents), Tarih ve Toplum 5
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ofﬁcials in the provinces often told the sultan what they thought hewanted to hear,
nor were they above downright lies.36
One of the most contested issues in the historiography on the massacres is
the degree of responsibility that accrued to Sultan Abdu¨lhamid II himself.
Although it is highly unlikely that someone as politically prudent as he
would issue a direct order for massacres, it is the view of this writer that
there is substantial evidence, albeit circumstantial, that points in the direction
of his benign neglect, if not actual covert support for the perpetrators of the
massacres and forced conversions. As to the conversions and actual or potential
re-conversions to Christianity, the ofﬁcial line was that the mass conversions of
Armenians were not to be accepted but individual conversions were to be con-
sidered. As will be seen, this left the Armenian neophyte Muslims in a danger-
ous state of limbo, and open to the charge of potential apostasy. It is my
considered opinion that this was not accidental or fortuitous.
T H E H AM I D I A N MA S S A C R E S A N D MA S S C O N V E R S I O N S O F A RM E N I A N S
Particularly after the Sason massacre (18 August–10 September 1894), the
1895–1896 Zeytun uprising, and the various massacres that occurred in
1895–1896 in various localities, there is no doubt that the majority of the
Ottoman Armenians in Anatolia lived in a state of terror.37 Even in the docu-
ments published by the modern Turkish state, on the basis of the ofﬁcial
papers of Minister of Police Hu¨seyin Nazım Pas¸a, the discrepancies in the
number of the dead on both sides is a giveaway.38 In the “troubles” at
Trabzon on 13 September 1895, the Muslim dead numbered eleven whereas
the Armenians lost 182.39 In Erzurum on 23 October the ratio was ﬁve
Muslim dead to ﬁfty Armenians. In Bitlis, on 26 October, the toll is,
Muslims 38 dead and 135 wounded, Armenians 132 dead and 40
wounded.40 It is noteworthy that in almost all cases there are far more Arme-
nian dead than wounded, suggesting a very unequal struggle. In Diyarbekir
on 10 October, the Police Commissariat reported seventy Muslim dead and
(2007): 113–46. On 26 August 1896 a group of Armenian revolutionaries staged a raid on the
Ottoman Bank in Istanbul hoping to attract the attention of the Great Powers to their cause. This
event has been extensively covered in the literature. See for example, Christopher Walker,
Armenia, 167, who refers to the mob bearing “clubs, similar, carefully shaped.”
36 Abdu¨lhamid Kırmızı, Abdu¨lhamid’in Valileri: Osmanlı Vilayet I˙daresi, 1895–1908
(Abdu¨lhamid’s governors: Provincial administration in the Hamidian state) (Istanbul, 2007),
105–9.
37 Dadrian, History of the Armenian Genocide, 113–31.
38 The sheer discrepancy in the number of Muslim and Armenian dead could not be hidden even
by those ofﬁcial documents carefully chosen to make the Turkish case that what happened was
legitimate self-defense against Armenian “terrorism.” In this I follow the method used by Edhem
Eldem in his, “26 Ag˘ustos 1896 ‘Banka Vakası’ ve 1896 ‘Ermeni Olayları.”
39 Hu¨seyin Nazım Pas¸a, Ermeni Olayları Tarihi, vol. 1, 94.
40 Ibid., 98–99.
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eighty wounded against more than three hundred Armenians dead and one
hundred wounded.41 In Bayburt on 4 November, against eight dead and
eleven wounded on the Muslim side, 170 Armenians died and thirty-ﬁve
were wounded.42
Diyarbekir, where one of the worst massacres occurred on 2–5 November
1895, features largely in the documents on conversion. On 2 November the
French Consul Gustave Meyrier telegrammed his Ambassador Paul Cambon,
“The city is engulfed in ﬁre and blood. Save us.”43 On 10 November 1895,
the governor, Enis Pas¸a, reported: “In some areas entire villages of Armenians
have been converting and this is causing the kaza authorities to ask for instruc-
tions. As these conversions are not very convincing I humbly ask for instruc-
tions.”44 The governor was referred to an irade (imperial order) dated 1
Tes¸rin-i Sani 1311 (14 November 1895), which established the ofﬁcial position:
“[According to the irade] in order to avoid the misrepresentation of the conver-
sion of the Armenians, if they apply again when order is restored, then their
conversions can be processed according to the proper procedure. Until then
the matter should be passed over with wise measures.”45 This formula of
“wise measures” is repeated throughout the documentation and in the context
is clearly a euphemism for “palliative” or “temporary.”
The ofﬁcial position appears to have been as follows. If the mass conversions
of the Armenians was accepted, this would appear to the outside world as an
ofﬁcial policy of mass forced conversions. Also, the inter-communal tension
created by the recent “disturbances” (ig˘tis¸as¸at) had still not abated: “You are
to bear in mind that to cause offence to one section of the population at a
time when we are trying to win the hearts of the population will lead to
untold complications.”46 Presumably the “section of the population” that was
being spared was the Muslims who would be offended by what they would
perceive as insincere conversions.
In the wake of the general atmosphere of massacre and insecurity that
reigned in Anatolia during this period, case after case of mass conversion
was reported from the provinces. On 5 November 1895, the vilayet of
Erzurum reported that in the last week three villages—Hınzıri, Korikul, and
Humlar in the kaza of Tercan—had expressed the desire to “convert to Islam
of their own free will.” However, the governor openly stated, “These
41 Ibid., 102.
42 Ibid., 103.
43 Meyrier, Les Massacres de Diarbekir, 85 (my translation).
44 BOA A.MKT MHM 636/25 29, Tes¸rin-i Evvel 1311/10 Nov. 1895, Governor of Diyarbekir
Enis Pas¸a to Grand Vizier’s Ofﬁce.
45 Ibid. The term used in all the ofﬁcial correspondence is “tedabir-i hakimane ile is¸in
gec¸is¸tirilmesi.”
46 Ibid. This last sentence in the draft memo was crossed out. These cancelled sentences in draft
memos provide interesting insights into the ofﬁcial mind.
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conversions are the result of fear of attacks and will not look good to friend and
foe.” The Porte replied: “The said conversion of the Christian villages is due to
a reason and that is their fear of the assaults of the Kurds. In this case you are to
make clear that mass conversions are not permitted (mu¨ctemian ihtidaların caiz
olmadıg˘ı). You are also instructed to defend them from attack and prevent
undesirable events.”47
The formula of “not looking good to friend and foe” (yar ve ag˘yara hos¸
go¨ru¨nmemek ) is an obvious reference to foreign consuls, missionaries, and
the like. A few days later the vilayet of Sıvas likewise reported the following:
“Today some two thousand Kurds attacked the town of Divrig˘i and started
looting the goods of the Christians. So far twenty-three Armenians have
been killed and some ﬁve hundred people, men and women, have applied by
a petition through their village elders to become Muslim of their own free
will and to become circumcised. If the Kurds do not listen to reason, it will
be necessary to use armed force against them. . . . The conversion of ﬁve
hundred people at once is likely to draw attention and this will not have
good results just now.”48 The reference to “drawing attention” and “not
having good results just now” was, again, a clear reference to potential
foreign observers. The answer by the Porte left no doubt about this: “You
have reported that some ﬁve hundred people have applied to convert. For
this to be accepted by the government would mean that it would be shown
by subversive elements as the result of fear and as such it is not acceptable pol-
itically. You are to tell the applicants that their conversion can only be accepted
after order has been restored.”49 Sıvas continued to be a ﬂashpoint. Two days
later the governor reported that in the town of Darende some two hundred
Armenians had applied to convert to Islam and “were applying every day to
the government ofﬁces.” They had been turned away according to ofﬁcial
instructions.50
An observation is in order here. The reference to “people applying every day
to have their conversions accepted” refers to the ofﬁcial conversion procedure
in force in the Ottoman Empire at this time, as mentioned in the introduction.
In times of extreme crisis, such as the massacres of the 1890s, an Armenian
village that had offered to become Muslim, but had not yet been accepted,
were in a dangerous state of limbo, making them even more of a target for
47 BOA A.MKT MHM 638/32, 23 Tes¸rin-i Evvel 1311/5 Nov. 1895; 27, Tes¸rin-I Evvel 1311/9
Nov. 1895, Governor of Erzurum Rauf Pas¸a, reply by Special Commission of Ministers. Tercan is
today a sub-prefecture of Erzincan province. Hınzıri (or Hınzoru) is today a village in Erzincan
called Tanyeri/Pınarlıkaya. See, Nuri Akbayar, Osmanlı Yer Adları So¨zlu¨g˘u¨ (Dictionary of
Ottoman place names).
48 BOA A.MKT MHM 660/35 4, Tes¸rin-I Sani 1311/17 Nov. 1895, telegram from Governor of
Sıvas Halil Pas¸a to Grand Vezirate.
49 Ibid., Sublime Porte to vilayet of Sıvas, 5, Tesrin-i Sani 1311/18 Nov. 1895.
50 Ibid., vilayet of Sıvas to Sublime Porte, 7, Tes¸rin-i Sani 1311/20 Nov. 1895.
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their enemies who could accuse them at any time of insincerity or, even worse,
potential apostasy.
In some cases, out of desperation and in order to force the hand of the gov-
ernment, Armenians even declared that they had had themselves circumcised.
On 12 November 1895, it was reported from the vilayet of Mamu¨retu¨laziz that
the Armenians from the village of Perri had “performed their own circumci-
sions” (kendu¨ kendilerine hitanlarını icra eyledikleri). Yet this was insufﬁcient;
the Porte replied: “This matter results from two reasons. One is the fear of
the attacks of the Kurds, the other is to enable them at a later date to complain
to the foreigners that they were converted by force. . . . They are to be told that
if they still want to convert individually when order is restored the matter will
be considered according to the proper procedure and precedent.”51
On 27 November the vilayet of Bitlis reported “all the men and women” in
three villages attached to the kaza of Genc, Mezan, Erzif, and Tanimaveran, had
applied to convert. The answer from Istanbul was almost copied verbatim from
the telegram above: “The ofﬁcial acceptance of mass conversions by Arme-
nians will cause this to be seen as forced conversion. . . . If they apply again
when order has been restored, the matter will be considered according to
proper procedure and precedent. Until then the matter should be passed over
with wise measures as ordered in the Imperial irade.”52
In some cases the conversion issue arises in what seems to be quite mundane
circumstances. On 27 December, the mutasarrıf (sub-district governor) of
Dersim asked the following question: “What is to be done about people who
were previously Armenian when they were ﬁance´ed and now want to get
married as Muslims?” The problem arose because the ofﬁcial refusal to recog-
nize Armenian conversions was holding things up bureaucratically. A related
issue was that neo-Muslim Armenians were demanding to be registered as
Muslims, and as such, exempt from the military service tax, the bedel-i
askeri. At this point, the issue of “voluntary” conversion being carried out
“without any coercion, force or pressure” is stressed and repeated so many
times (verbatim three times within two paragraphs) that it seems particularly
suspicious. Particularly instructive is the reason given in support of how
51 BOA A.MKT MHM 657/24 30, Tes¸rin-i Evvel 1311/12 Nov. 1895, Governor of Mamure-
tu¨laziz, Amiri to Sublime Porte; 31, Tes¸rin-i Evvel 1311/13 Nov. 1895, Sublime Porte to Governor
of Mamu¨retu¨laziz. Mamu¨retu¨laziz is present-day Elazıg˘. Perri is the present-day bucak (district) of
Akpazar. See Tahir Sezen, Osmanlı Yer Adları (Ottoman place names publication of the BOA).
52 BOA A.MKT MHM 619/24, Deputy Governor of Bitlis O¨mer Pas¸a to Sublime Porte; 14,
Tes¸rin-i Sani 1311/27 Nov. 1895, Sublime Porte to Bitlis Province. Today Genc is a kaza of
Bingo¨l. It is almost impossible to discern today just which villages are being referred to. Almost
all have either had their names changed, been combined with other villages and given a new
name, or have simply ceased to exist. Name changing has been ofﬁcial policy as part of the
effort to wipe out the historical memory of non-Muslims inhabiting Anatolia. On this see Fuat
Du¨ndar, I˙ttihat ve Terakki’nin Mu¨slu¨manları I˙skan Politikası 1913–1918 (The Committee of
Union and Progress and its policy of Muslim resettlement) (Istanbul, 2001), 81–84.
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“voluntary” these conversions were: “The fact that these conversions were
carried out after the restoration of order and after their villages were hit by
Kurds and the Kurds dispersed, shows that they converted only because they
had found the true religion.”53 Apparently, that fear of more Kurdish attacks
might be a motive for conversion did not occur to the report’s author, who
was just a bit too eager to stress that the Armenians had experienced a moral
enlightenment.
Another case of dubious moral enlightenment is a petition presented by the
Armenians of the kaza of Koyulhisar in Sivas, and it is worth quoting in total
since it is a particularly poignant example of the plight of a desperate people:
We are Armenians from Koyulhisar and our lives and property have been spared thanks
to our beloved Padis¸ah. Fifteen days after the disturbances some of us, of our own
accord, decided to accept Islam. Now the local government is insisting that we
become Armenian again, but we did not convert out of fear or pressure. We saw that
this was the true faith may Allah grant eternal life to our glorious Padis¸ah, amen.
Until now everybody was free to belong to any confession they wanted. Has this per-
mission been revoked? If our Islam had been due to fear, all of us would have converted.
But some of us have remained Armenians. Please for the sake of Allah and our sultan
send us reliable ofﬁcials who can investigate our behavior and what is in our hearts.
They will see that we converted of our own free will and register us accordingly in
the population and property registers. Because when we travel here and there our com-
mercial papers and our identity papers state that we are Armenians, but in our hearts and
our dress we are Muslims. This causes awkward questions. We are presenting this peti-
tion in Armenian because the Muslims will not write it for us. In short, may the state
hang us if it pleases, we are willing and we will not turn our back on Islam (Devletimiz
bizi idam etsu¨n ırazıyız Mu¨slu¨manlıg˘ımızdan vaz gec¸meyiz).54
The vali adopted a rather bleak view of the petition and pointed out that two
women from the same area had recently gone back to Christianity “after ﬁrmly
declaring for Islam.” He acknowledged the ofﬁcial order that “extreme care to
be taken in the matter of conversions” and recommended that no action be
taken “until the improvement of the weather,” when the petitioners could
be summoned to Sıvas for questioning.55
C O N V E R S I O N S A S FA L L O U T O F MA S S A C R E
In fact, most of the conversions that come up in the dispatches are reported after
the ostensible restoration of order, or at least after the worst of the massacres
were over. The kaza of Pu¨tu¨rge in Mamu¨retu¨laziz reported on 1 January,
53 BOA A.MKT MHM 658/10 10 Receb 1313/27 Dec. 1895, Vilayet of Mamu¨retu¨laziz Sec-
retariat, no. 409, forwarding copy of report from the mutasarrıf of Dersim, “Mahza hidayet-i
rabbani u¨zerine kabul-u¨ Islamiyet etmis¸ oldukları.”
54 BOA A.MKT 661/34 11 Mart 1312/24 Mar. 1896, vilayet of Sıvas to Sublime Porte, encl.,
petition signed by eleven residents of Koyulhisar, Turkish written in Armenian characters. My
thanks to Rober Koptas¸ for reading the original. Koyulhisar is today a kaza by the same name in
the vilayet of Sıvas. See Osmanlı Yer Adları.
55 Ibid., 20 Nisan 1312/3 May 1896, Vali of Sıvas, Halil Pas¸a to Sublime Porte.
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“Some one hundred Armenian and Nestorians, men and women, from the
S¸irvan village of Amirdun have converted to Islam and, summoning circumci-
zers, performed their circumcisions.” Similarly, in the district (nahiye) of
Kerker, and in the village of Keferdiz in Van and “several other villages,”
Christians had converted and “renewed their marriages, performed their cir-
cumcisions, and it is heard that they are praying ﬁve times a day in places
where there are mosques.” The report repeated that they were fully cognizant
of the order to “avoid the ofﬁcial acceptance of mass conversions as this will
imply fear of attacks by the Kurds,” yet pointed out that in none of the cases
mentioned above had the Christians ofﬁcially applied to have their status recog-
nized; they were simply living as Muslims and the matter was only coming up
because of bureaucratic hiccoughs like marriages, demands for exemption from
the bedel, or cases like “two Armenians who were members of the kazaAdmin-
istrative Council who are unable to perform their duties.” The kaymakam
(prefect) of Pu¨tu¨rge, apparently quite a resourceful ofﬁcial, had taken it upon
himself to carry out a secret investigation: “Through spies sent into their
midst it has been ascertained that they do not intend to renege on Islam.” He
indicated that in some areas all but a small minority had converted and that
“because this kaza is inhabited by savage and nomadic Kurds and we do not
have the necessary military force we are doing our best to keep order [we
request urgent instructions].”56
Ostentatious religious observance, grown men arranging for their own cir-
cumcision, couples renewing their marriage wows; all seem to indicate conver-
sion as a result of fear or at least severe pressure. The ofﬁcial’s reference to the
“savage Kurds” in the area also points in this direction and the implication
in the report is that the local forces were unable to secure the safety of the
neophyte Muslims.
Reports of conversions continued to pour in. The governor of Mamu¨retu¨laziz
wrote on 9 January, “During and after the recent troubles quite a few people
singly and in groups presented and continue to present petitions to have their
conversions recognized and to have their bedel cancelled. According to the
present orders we have done our best to make them change their minds and
to delay proceedings.”57 The Armenian Patriarchate in Istanbul did not fail
to protest to the authorities. In a communication dated 15 January the Patriarch
declared: “[It has been reported that] ﬁfteen Christian villages in the nahiye of
Eg˘in in the province of Mamu¨retu¨laziz, as a result of the recent terrible events,
fearing for their lives, have converted to Islam. They even became circumcised
and converted their church, which had been looted, into a mosque. The signed
56 Ibid., 19 Kanun-u Evvel 1311/31 Dec. 1895, vilayet of Mamu¨retu¨laziz forwarding report from
the kaza of Pu¨tu¨rge (today a municipality [ilc¸e] of the city of Malatya).
57 BOA A.MKT MHM 658/10 23 Receb 1313/9 Jan. 1896, Governor of Mamu¨retu¨laziz Rauf
Pas¸a to Sublime Porte.
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declaration that was sent by the mu¨du¨r of the place, to the effect that they
accepted Islam of their own free will, was signed because they feared for
their lives.” The Patriarch made it quite clear that there was nothing voluntary
about these conversions: “In the said areas of Anatolia hitherto unseen oppres-
sion and cruelty, insults to Christianity, and efforts to convert Christians have
been witnessed.” He declared that he had received this information in an ofﬁcial
letter written to the Patriarchate. Nor was the worst over, even though the
necessary orders had been sent: “The extraordinary fear and terror that the
recent terrible events caused continues to reign and the victims still feel threa-
tened.” The Patriarch demanded that the conditions be made propitious for the
eventual return to Christianity of these people, “in keeping with the principle
of the freedom of religion.”58 The Porte duly asked the governor of
Mamu¨retu¨laziz what was going on and asked why they had accepted the con-
versions in question. The province replied that the kaymakam of Eg˘in had
indeed disregarded ofﬁcial instructions and had accepted the petition of the
Armenians to convert, but there had been no coercion and that the statement
about the church being converted to a mosque was false. The governor
admitted, “Many Armenians had been applying singly or in groups and in
fact getting themselves circumcised, and we have been obeying the ofﬁcial
order to delay matters.”59 The Patriarchate repeated its demands a month
later: “Reports from the Armenian church Metropolitans (Marhasa) in the
area continue to come in to the effect that many Armenians, laymen as well
as priests, fearing for their lives in the recent terrible events, are showing them-
selves as Muslims. We demand that rapid and effective measures be taken
which will guarantee their safety if they return to their own faith.”60
It seems that although the Porte issued orders that Armenian conversions
were not to be accepted, some Ottoman ofﬁcials had different views and did
not hesitate to express them. On 15 January, the governor of Van, S¸emseddin
Pas¸a, reported that although, as per instructions, he had been turning down
Armenian conversion applications, he now felt that, “because the Armenians
here live in mixed villages with Kurds and therefore have a natural familiarity
with Muslims, this inclines many of them naturally to convert to Islam.” He
further noted that this was “causing great anxiety to the Armenian leaders,”
and therefore he had accepted the recent applications for conversion of
twenty-one Armenian men and women.61 This was not looked upon favorably
by Istanbul, however. A special commission of the Council of Ministers replied
58 Ibid., 29 Receb 1313/15 Jan. 1896, memo from the Patriarch of the Armenian milletMag˘akya
Ormanyan to Sublime Porte, no. 255.
59 Ibid., 3 Kanun-u Sani 1311/16 Jan. 1896, cipher telegram from Sublime Porte to vilayet of
Mamu¨retu¨laziz; 12 Kanun-u Sani 1312/25 Jan. 1896.
60 Ibid., 10 S¸ubat 1312/23 Feb. 1896.
61 BOAY.A RES. 85/12 2 S¸ubat 1312/15 Feb. 1896, Governor of Van, S¸emseddin Pas¸a to Yıldız
Palace.
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to the governor’s telegram: “Although according to the principle of the freedom
of religion, no objection can be made to individual conversions and their accep-
tance according to established practice and precedent, group conversions
will lead our enemies to claim that the Muslims are converting the Christians
by force.”62
The claim by the governor that Armenians were “naturally inclined” to
convert because they lived cheek by jowl with Kurds was clearly disingenuous,
and served to camouﬂage that most Armenians who converted were doing so
not out of some suddenly discovered afﬁnity for their Muslim neighbors, but
because they were afraid of them. Nonetheless, the reference to “the principle
of the freedom of religion,” both in the memo of the ministers and in the letter
of the Armenian Patriarchate, is important because it shows that the idea of the
Tanzimat period was at least kept alive as a polite ﬁction.
Indeed, that the Armenians of the area did not live in anything resembling
peace and harmony is born out by the ofﬁcial correspondence. On 2 January
the British Embassy complained to the Porte that they had heard that some
seventy Armenians from the districts of Ispayrıt and Hizan in Bitlis province
had ﬂed to the monastery on the island of Akhtamar on lake Van. The
Embassy claimed that this was because they feared for their lives since they
were the only survivors from thirty-three villages whose people had either
been killed or forced to convert. The Embassy asked that they be permitted
to remain in Akhdamar.63 The governor of Van, Nazım Pas¸a, S¸emseddin
Pas¸a’s predecessor, reported that the Katogigos of Van had asked for a guaran-
tee of safe conduct for these people, who amounted to some one hundred and
twenty souls. But he said their remaining in Van was not desirable, and they
should be sent back to Bitlis, “because they are not of the people of this pro-
vince.” However, the governor admitted, “Although instructions to this effect
were sent to the local authorities, it has not been possible to convince them
to go back.”64 The matter did not end there. On 4 January the governor of
Bitlis, O¨mer Pas¸a, wrote a long telegram that is very important as an indicator
of the ofﬁcial mind. The Pas¸a declared that the claim of the British Embassy
was totally baseless and that, “the six thousand Armenians living in the kaza
[of Hizan] continue to live there according to their religion and in all security.”
He asserted that the problem in the area was “entirely the work of a famous
Armenian subversive,” a certain Dilbos¸. O¨mer Pas¸a declared that Dilbos¸ did
not hesitate to attack and kill Muslim and Christian without distinction, and
62 Ibid., 13 Ramazan 1314/3 S¸ubat 1312/16 Feb. 1896, minutes of meeting of Special Commis-
sion of the Council of Ministers.
63 BOA A.MKT MHM 619/35 20 Kanun-u Evvel 1311, 20 Kanun-u Evvel 1311/2 Jan. 1896,
trans. of memo of British Embassy. Ispayrıt is today the village of Su¨ru¨cu¨ler in the vilayet of
Bitlis. Hizan is today the kaza of As¸ag˘ıkarasu in Bitlis. See, Osmanlı Yer Adları.
64 Ibid., 21 Kanun-u Evvel 1311/3 Jan. 1896, cipher telegram from Governor of Van to the
Sublime Porte.
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that the Armenians attempting to ﬂee to Akhtamar were in fact ﬂeeing Dilbos¸.
“Otherwise there is no reason for good Muslims living in this area since centu-
ries, in peace and harmony with Christians who always freely practiced their reli-
gion, to suddenly start behaving in a manner so reprehensible to our August
Master.”65 After providing a classic example of blaming the victims, the gover-
nor went on to declare: “If the claim of the British Embassy [that people were
being converted by force] were true this would not be conﬁned to sixty or so
Armenians out of a population of some six thousand and it would not have
been possible for some sixty Armenians to get past so many Kurds who are in
the area and escape to Akhdamar.” Thus, the governor was arguing, the Kurds
would have done a proper job and not left a single Armenian. As to those Arme-
nians who did convert, “In Hizan a few villages of Armenians did convert of their
own free will and applied to the authorities to have their conversions recognized.
This was not done and they continue to live as Muslims, have the ezan chanted,
and pray ﬁve times a day. It is this that has been used by the Armenian subver-
sives who seize upon the least excuse to slander the Sublime State.” The gover-
nor added that since Akhatamar was “virtually a home of subversion” the
refugees should not be allowed to swell the numbers there.66
Two days later O¨mer Pas¸a clariﬁed his position still further:
[According to the latest information received from the kaymakam of Hizan] two thou-
sand six men and one thousand ﬁfteen women, making a total of three thousand two
hundred and eleven, the majority in ﬁfty-four villages of Armenians, have made it
known that they have accepted Islam of their own free will. Some of the people of
the said villages kept their own faith. This shows that the claim of the Embassy is
entirely baseless. Because if the Armenians were supposedly invited into Islam and if
those who refused were killed, all the remaining Armenians in these villages would
have been dead and even those going to Akhtamar would have been killed.
The governor could not resist adding, “Those misinforming the Embassy are a
few well-known missionaries who are in fact the ones who are after converting
people.”67 Apparently there was nothing unusual about the fact that three thou-
sand and twenty-one people should suddenly become enamored with Islam and
seek the true path “of their own free will,” when they were surrounded by
hostile Kurds.
A B D U C T I O N O F WOMEN
That this “free will” was often the result of terror was born out by the efforts
subsequently made by some foreign consuls to rescue women who had been
65 BOA A.MKT MHM 619/35 22 Kanun-u Evvel 1311/4 Jan. 1896, cipher telegram from Gov-
ernor of Van Nazım Pas¸a to Sublime Porte.
66 Ibid. “Dilbos¸” is evidently a corruption of “dilbo,” meaning “liar” in Armenian, and, as an
anonymous reviewer observed, “is obviously an insult conjured by the Ottoman authorities.” My
thanks to this reviewer.
67 Ibid., 24 Kanun-u Sani 1311/6 Jan. 1896. Also, it seems that the Pas¸a could not add.
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abducted during the massacres and forced into marriage. A large portion of
Gustave Meyrier’s correspondence from Diyarbekir deals with this issue: “Yes-
terday they brought back six women, none of them wanted to go back to her
family. I know and I have living proof at hand that these unfortunates
behave like this because they are threatened with death by the Kurds and
they have no conﬁdence in the protection of the authorities.” He proposed
that rather than lodging these women in Muslim homes where they were
subject to threats, they should be handed back to their religious leaders and
kept in the church during the investigation.68 A few days later Meyrier reported
that a nine-year-old girl had been brought in who refused to return to her com-
munity. When the bishop of the Syriac Catholics intervened, Governor Enis
Pas¸a “publicly reminded him of the Salonica affair where two consuls had
been killed in similar circumstances and said he could not expose himself to
similar inconveniences. I take this as a personal and direct threat.” This state-
ment about the “killing of two Consuls in Salonica in similar circumstances”
was indeed perceived as a threat by the French and British Embassies, who
protested energetically to the Porte.69
Enis Pas¸a came as close as possible to having his knuckles rapped ofﬁcially
and he was asked in rather stern terms: “In order for there not to ensue anything
untoward and likely to cause murmurings please clarify if such a conversation
did or did not take place.”70 Enis Pas¸a replied: “Christian women who had been
dispersed here and there during the troubles are being recovered and handed
back to their families or religious leaders.” There was a problem however:
“Some of these have become Muslim of their own free will and married
Muslims and are now ﬁrmly declaring that they will not accept either their
families or Christianity.”71 Enis Pas¸a then went on to recount his conversation
with the Syriac bishop. Apparently, just as the Armenian metropolitan and the
bishop were visiting with him, a group of girls and women were brought in
from the surrounding villages. Questioned in the presence of the metropolitan
and the bishop, they declared, “they would in no circumstance go back to their
families or churches.” At this point the bishop had intervened over the case of
a twelve-year-old Syriac girl who was insisting that she was Muslim and an
68 Meyrier, Les Massacres de Diarbekir; Gustave Meyrier to Paul Cambon, 12 Mar. 1896, 85
(my translation).
69 Ibid., 175. It is interesting that Enis Pas¸a should bring up the famous “Salonica incident” of
May 1876, where the conversion of a Bulgarian girl and her subsequent abduction by the Christians
of that city caused a full-blown riot and the French and German consuls were murdered by the
mobs. Here Enis Pas¸a may well have been subtly threatening Meyrier. On the Salonica Incident,
see Mark Mazower, Salonica, City of Ghosts: Christians, Muslims and Jews 1430–1950
(London, 2004), 170–75.
70 BOA A.MKTMHM 637/16 13 Mart 1312/26 Mar. 1896, cipher telegram from Sublime Porte
to vilayet of Diyarbekir. “Sızıldı” (murmuring, lamentation) was one of the most common Ottoman
euphemisms for “trouble from foreigners.”
71 Ibid. 14 Mart 1312/ 27 Mar. 1896, vali of Diyarbekir Enis Pas¸a to Sublime Porte.
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adult. The bishop stated that as a child her testimony was invalid and that she
should be returned to her community. At this point the conversation took an
interesting turn:
I told the bishop that we also did not approve of the likes of her remaining Muslim and
that the reason why we did not ofﬁcially carry out their conversions was precisely in
order for them to be able to return to their previous religions now or later. But nor
can it be acceptable, given the times and the circumstances, to drag such a person by
the arm and hair to the church, when they are openly and in front of witnesses declaring
that they are Muslims. This is also against the principle of religious freedom (hu¨rriyet-i
mezhebiye) that my government has always defended, and touches upon the matter of
national feelings (hissiyat-ı milliye tokunur). From small matters such as this big pro-
blems may arise, particularly as public excitement has only just been appeased and
efforts are being made to assure its continuity.72
This is a cleverly formulated position. The reference to the ofﬁcial line to not
accept mass conversion is mentioned, ostensibly keeping the door open for an
eventual return to Christianity, although it was highly unlikely that a terrorized
young person could ﬁnd the courage to take such a step.
The issue of the abduction of women also had a speciﬁc gender dimension.
Very often, in addition to fear, many women refused to return to their commu-
nities due to shame. A loss of virginity in these circumstances would condemn
them to lifelong stigmatization at home and end their marriage prospects.
Forced conversion was therefore much more traumatic for women because
it involved institutionalized rape under the cover of “marriage” to their
abductors.73
What is most remarkable was the Pas¸a’s reference to “religious freedom,”
which was clearly a polite ﬁction in this context, not to say a travesty. Even
more striking is his reference to “national feelings,” because it gives away
the nature of the massacres as a manifestation of “national feeling,” and
implies that a provocative act could once again enﬂame them and spark
further massacres. Even so, he makes no direct mention of the Salonica
affair, but only states, “big problems could arise from small matters.”74
The British Embassy continued to pressure the Foreign Ministry, claiming,
“Over one hundred Christians remain in the hands of the Kurds and are
afraid to reveal their true religious inclination because of fear.”75 The Ministry
72 Ibid.
73 For a discussion of “sexual humiliation used to intimidate the Armenian community” during
the genocide of 1915, see, Katherine Derderian, “Common Fate, Different Experience: Gender-
Speciﬁc Aspects of the Armenian Genocide, 1915–1917, Holocaust and Genocide Studies 19
(2005): 1–25. Although this article deals with a later period, the experiences of Armenian
women in the 1890s must have been very similar.
74 Meyrier, Les Massacres de Diarbekir. Meyrier was not present when the conversation took
place, but had the account from the bishop. Nonetheless, it is possible that Enis Pas¸a mentioned
the Salonica incident because he was from that city.
75 Ibid., 28 Mart 1896/10 Apr. 1896, Foreign Minister Tevﬁk Pas¸a to Sublime Porte, Foreign
Ministry Chancery, no. 292.
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also relayed information from the British Embassy to the effect that the com-
mission which had been sent to recover Christian women had brought
sixteen such women to Diyarbekir on 11 March: “Because they were threatened
by death by the Kurds who had abducted them and by the Muslim population,
they said they did not want to go back to their families and did not trust the local
authorities to protect them. . .. These threats led them to change their minds
[about declaring for Christianity].”76
Meyrier repeatedly told his ambassador that the Ottoman authorities in
Diyarbekir were deliberately blocking his efforts to reunite abducted women
with their families. “Their situation is indeed lamentable; in all this morbid
affair, they deserve the most compassion.”77 He reported further that the
abducted victims were threatened “not only by their ravishers but also by
other Muslims.” Meyrier had sent one Muslim and two Christians into the vil-
lages around Diyarbekir to rescue the victims of abduction, but they had been
largely unsuccessful. “It seems many murders have been committed in the vil-
lages for similar reasons.” The consul had given the delegation a list of some
hundred names, but they had returned with only one woman and her daughter.
The delegation was sure that the Kurds hid the victims and sometimes even
transported them from one village to another.78
British Vice-Consul C. M. Hallward, in Diyarbekir, summarized the situ-
ation: “In all about 8,000 appear to have been killed in the vilayet, and
25,000 turned Moslem. Upwards of 500 women and girls have been
abducted. . . . I give these ﬁgures for what they are worth and subject to correc-
tion . . . . The general belief is that the whole thing was organized by Ennis
Pas¸a, the Vali, in concert with some of the leading Moslems.”79 Meyrier had
already identiﬁed some of these “leading Muslims,” including Cemil Pas¸a,
“ex-governor of Yemen known for his fanaticism,” and Arif Efendi, a local
leader of the Kurds. At the behest of the embassies, the Porte was obliged to
send a commission of enquiry to Diyarbekir, led by Abdullah Pas¸a, one of
the sultan’s aides-de-camps, and one of the few Ottoman ofﬁcials about
whom the diplomats had anything good to say.80 Meyrier stated, “Abdullah
Pas¸a knows that the tension in the area is kept up by them.”81 Abdullah Pas¸a
reported that it was indeed Cemil Pas¸a and Arif Efendi who had spread a
rumor during Ramazan that “all the Christians were going to be massacred
76 Ibid., 16 Mart 1312/29 Mar. 1896, Foreign Minister Tevﬁk Pas¸a to Sublime Porte, Foreign
Ministry Chancery, no. 117.
77 Meyrier, Les Massacres de Diarbekir, 175–79, 20 Mar. 1896.
78 Ibid., 21 Mar. 1896, 179.
79 Vice-Consul Hallward to Consul Cumberlach, 17 Mar. 1896; British Blue Book: Turkey, 1896,
as cited in Meyrier, Les Massacres de Diarbekir, 215–16.
80 Walker, Armenia, 147. Chief Dragoman of the British Embassy Adam Block referred to
Abdullah Pas¸a as “a fairly straight man.”
81 Meyrier, Les Masacres de Diarbekir, 171.
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and that this was an order of the sultan.” Abdullah Pas¸a was particularly scath-
ing about Arif Efendi: “Although the imperial instructions that the said people
be scolded and told that measures will be taken if they do not mend their ways
will work on Cemil Pas¸a, no amount of advice can effect Arif Efendi who is
known for his bad behavior . . . and is after increasing his inﬂuence and
glory by provoking further disturbances.” Accordingly, Abdullah Pas¸a
advised that Arif be exiled “as an example to others of like mind.”82 The
Porte, however, considerably softened the punishment and instructed Abdullah
Pas¸a that “Arif Efendi not be exiled but that it be suggested to him that he
remove himself temporarily to Mosul.”83 On 24 March, Abdullah Pas¸a asked
permission to end the commission and return to Istanbul since “peace and
order reigns again and we have seen the end of Ramazan without any
trouble.”84 Meyrier felt that the issue of abducted girls and women had
broken Abdullah Pas¸a: “Abdullah Pas¸a, who at the beginning had taken this
matter to heart, told me lately that he was discouraged and he no longer wanted
to occupy himself with it. He has certainly received orders from his superiors
which have changed, if not his mode of thought, at least his mode of action.”85
Meanwhile, Enis Pas¸a, far from being held responsible for the massacres,
remained at his post. This was despite various promises that the French and
British Embassies extracted from the Porte that he would be dismissed. The
French Embassy actually told Meyrier that the Council of Ministers had
suggested to the sultan that he be replaced.86 Evidently, Enis Pas¸a had the
sultan’s support because he was still in place well after the Inspection Commit-
tee left Diyarbekir. Moreover, he continued to deny the British claims that a
large number of Christians were still being held by Kurds, and to report on
cases of, “women and children who were dispersed here and there during the
troubles and are now being recovered and turned over to their families.” He
reported on 17 April that two women and two boys had been brought in
from the kazas of Eg˘in and Garb. The two boys and one of the women had
declared that they were Christians and had been handed over to their families.
The other woman, who had a six-year-old child with her, “had insisted that she
was a Muslim even after she had been put in an empty room with her brother.”
Presumably the brother was to try to dissuade her.87 As late as the summer of
82 BOA Y.A HUS 347/58 23 S¸ubat 1311/8 Mar. 1895, Committee of Inspection to Sublime
Porte.
83 Ibid., 23 Ramazan 1311/10 Mar. 1896, Sublime Porte Receiver’s Ofﬁce, Grand Vizier Rıfat
Pas¸a.
84 BOA Y.A HUS 348/52 11 Mart 1312/24 Mar. 1896, Committee of Inspection to Sublime
Porte.
85 Meyrier, Les Massacres de Diarbekir, 183.
86 Ibid., Jules de La Bouliere to Gustave Meyrier, 27 Feb. 1896, 184.
87 BOAA.MKTMHM637/19 4 Nisan 1312/17 Apr. 1896, Enis Pas¸a to Sublime Porte. That this
particular woman had a six-year-old child shows that she had “married” some six years previously,
probably making it impossible to return even if she wanted to. The child would have been born
T H E A R M E N I A N Q U E S T I O N I S F I N A L LY C L O S E D 363
Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0010417509000152
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Lebanese American University, on 13 Nov 2017 at 08:48:23, subject to the Cambridge
1896 Enis Pas¸a continued to hold his post. Again responding to an accusation
of the British Embassy that he was carrying out forced conversions, he conﬁ-
dently declared, “These are the slanders of enemies” (mu¨fteriat-ı
bedhahaniyeden).88
M A S S C O N V E R S I O N A S A D I P L OMAT I C I S S U E
No doubt Enis Pas¸a would have counted the foreign consuls among his
“enemies.” One of the most celebrated cases of forced conversion and sub-
sequent return to Christianity was that of the Armenians of Birecik near
present-day Urfa. The case became something of a cause ce´le`bre as an inter-
national diplomatic crisis involving the British, French, and Russian govern-
ments. On 3 March 1895 it was reported that a sizeable population (some
two hundred households) of Armenians had converted to Islam in Birecik, in
southeast Anatolia. The Ottoman government had therefore consented to
send a mixed commission to the area, consisting of two ofﬁcials from the
vilayet of Aleppo, and the dragoman of the British Embassy, Fitzmaurice.89
The commission had interviewed leaders of the convert community who
were named as “ex-Gregorians Hac¸ik Efendi, now called Mehmet S¸akir
Efendi, and Abos Efendi now called S¸eyh Mu¨slim Efendi, ex-Catholic Hacıbe-
kuzan Efendi now called I˙brahim Efendi.” The leaders of the community
openly stated, “The recent events had caused them to fear for their lives, and
that was why they became Muslim.” They also promised that they would not
convert back to Christianity once the danger was over. Also, “The conversion
of the church which they had made into a mosque was done entirely at their
own expense, and they had no intention whatever of converting it back to a
church.” The Armenians interviewed were then asked to sign a report written
by the commission. The report recorded, “The community had not been sub-
jected to any pressure or force in accepting Islam but had only acted out of
fear of recent events, being obviously in a state of great distress and poverty
after the recent calamities and the sacking of their property.” On 28 May the
vali of Aleppo was asked his opinion on the matter. The Ottoman governor
reiterated that the Armenian converts had converted “only because they
feared for their lives” (sırf muhafaza-i hayat maksadına mu¨steniddir). He
pointed out that the state had two options. If it wanted to allow the Armenians
to remain where they were, and revert to Christianity, it was necessary to
some years before the massacres. Abduction of Armenian women by the Kurds was a common
complaint throughout the period. See Arme´nouhie Ke´vonian, Les Noces Noires de Gulizar
(Paris, 1993).
88 BOA A.MKT MHM 637/33 1 Temmuz 1312/14 July 1896, Enis Pas¸a to Sublime Porte.
89 BOAY.A.HUS 352/1, 18 S¸ubat 1311/3 Mar. 1895, Sublime Porte, Ofﬁce of the Grand Vizier,
report prepared by accountant of the evkaf of Aleppo Ali Rıza, President of the Court of Aleppo
Mustafa, Dragoman of the British Embassy Fitzmaurice.
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“execute some of those Muslims who had taken part in the killing and looting,
in order to frighten the [rest of the population].” This would only work,
however, for the urban areas. Those in the countryside would still be unable
to circulate among the Kurdish tribes who were their neighbors, “which is in
fact the very reason for their insistence on the sincerity of their conversion.”
The second option was to move the converts somewhere far from Birecik, so
that when they re-converted back to Christianity, their Muslim neighbors
would not know that they were apostates.90
Fitzmaurice remarked on what I have called the dangerous state of limbo for
all new converts:
As the legal formalities necessary on conversion to Islam had not yet been performed,
the Government refused to recognize them as such before demanding instructions from
Aleppo; and, as the population were still menacing in their attitude, and reproached them
with insincerity in their newly-adopted faith, to prove their sincerity, in the face of
threats, the Armenians proceeded to convert their church into a mosque, which they
called “Hamidieh Mosque” after His Imperial Majesty the Sultan; some of them took
a second wife, went through the rite of circumcision. . . . They now all wear turbans,
and are apparently most zealous in their attendance at the mosque and in the other obser-
vances of their newly adopted religion. . . . A declaration of Christianity by them at the
present would be most dangerous.91
Fitzmaurice for his part was convinced that the massacres and conversions
were the work of the central government and the local authorities: “In the ﬁnal
massacre, faced with a Moslem mob crying ‘Our Padishah has ordered that the
Armenians be massacred, and that no Christians are to be left in the country,’
the Ottoman ofﬁcial and reserve soldiers who had turned up in early December
stood aside.”92 From Birecik, Fitzmaurice traveled to Urfa, the scene of the
most severe massacres where, he said, eight thousand Armenians had been
killed in two days, half of them burnt alive in the cathedral.93
Fitzmaurice returned to Istanbul in April but was back in Birecik on 30 May
as part of the Birecik Commission of Enquiry that the sultan had agreed to
form. He also claimed to have persuaded at least some of the Armenians
who had converted, “under the inﬂuence of terror,” to return to Christianity,
and to demand the protection promised by the sultan. But he was not so suc-
cessful in the villages since “he found them too fearful.”94 This is born out
by the Ottoman sources. The vilayet of Aleppo reported on 10 September
1896 that in Urfa, “The majority (kısm-ı azamı) of the one thousand Armenians
who had converted to Islam, having seen the return of peace and order, have
90 Ibid., 88.
91 Vice-Consul Fitzmaurice to Sir P. Currie, 5 Mar. 1896, Turkey, no. 5 (1896), Correspondence
Relating to the Asiatic Provinces of Turkey, 4–5.
92 Berridge, Gerald Fitzmaurice (1865–1939): Chief Dragoman of the British Embassy in
Turkey (Leiden, 2007), 27.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid., 28–30.
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returned to their old faith. The remnants insist on remaining Muslims. The
English ofﬁcial Fitzmaurice seems satisﬁed with this outcome and is preparing
to leave.”95
It appears that by the summer of 1897 fear still ruled, but the worst was over
and a shade of normalcy returned. There is a very interesting paper trail relating
to the conversion to Islam and potential return to Christianity of the Armenians
in the sancaks of Sason and Genc in the vilayet of Bitlis. On 11 August, the
Foreign Ministry was informed that in Genc a total of 105 households in
twelve nahiyes had made it known that they had converted during the “troubles
of eighteen ninety ﬁve,” and now wanted to return to their original faith, but
were afraid to do so. Some of the Armenians who had reverted to their original
faith had complained that the population ofﬁcer (nu¨fus mu¨du¨ru¨) of Genc, a
certain Haydar Efendi, had tampered with the registers, and by increasing the
ages of male children was now demanding that they pay an extortionate
amount of military exemption tax (bedel i askeri). In reaction, the Armenians
had stated that they were returning to Islam.96 What is remarkable here is
that the Armenian Islamo/Christians felt their position was at least safe
enough to enable them to bargain with the state. One week later the vilayet
of Bitlis reported, “All the Christians who had converted to Islam during the
troubles have now returned to their old faith without suffering pressure of
any kind.” It was further reported that the Armenians who had claimed they
were being unfairly taxed were part of the “unregistered population”
(nu¨fus-u mektume).97
In response to the declaration that they would go back to Islam, the vali of
Bitlis blandly declared: “It is entirely up to them to decide whether they
want to become Muslims or remain as Christians . . . but it has been determined
by the Ministry of Finance that they are to pay the bedel from the date of their
birth to the date they became unregistered population.” In other words, the state
was telling them that they were responsible for their tax arrears as Christians
even if they turned Muslim. In the event, the people in question remained
Christians.98 Despite the evident tension, the ofﬁcial ﬁction was kept up. On
95 BOA Y.A HUS 359/6 28 Ag˘ustos 1312/10 Sept. 1896, vilayet of Aleppo to Sublime Porte.
96 BOA A.MKTMHM 620/50 29 Temmuz 1313/11 Aug. 1897, Foreign Minister Tevﬁk Pas¸a to
Sublime Porte, Foreign Ministry Secretariat, no. 1969. The nahiye in question were Pac¸ar, Zeyr,
Morvarik, I˙zmunag˘, Herpersehur, Zihten, Darbug˘, Dareyeni, Karpar, C¸ananles¸iye, Valber, and
Gurnus. I have been unable to determine what these localities are called today. None of them
appears in Osmanlı Yer Adları or Osmanlı Yer Adları So¨zlu¨g˘u¨. It is highly possible that they no
longer exist as distinct entities.
97 BOA A.MKTMHM 620/50 29 Temmuz 1313/11 Aug. 1897, Foreign Minister Tevﬁk Pas¸a to
Sublime Porte, ForeignMinistry Secretariat, no. 1969. “Nu¨fus-uMektume” was an ofﬁcial category
of people who had not been counted in the 1882–1885 census. I thank Cem Behar for this infor-
mation. On the Ottoman censuses, see, Cem Behar and Alan Duben, Istanbul Households (Cam-
bridge, UK, 1991), 15–20.
98 Ibid. Vali of Bitlis O¨mer Pas¸a to Sublime Porte. 5 Ag˘ustos 1313/18 Aug. 1897, “Hıristiyan
kalmak veya Islam olmak her kesin ihtiyarında oldug˘u. . ..”
366 S E L I M D E R I N G I L
Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0010417509000152
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Lebanese American University, on 13 Nov 2017 at 08:48:23, subject to the Cambridge
8 November the Foreign Ministry wrote, “The claim of the British Embassy
that the Christians who converted during the troubles were now afraid to
return to their old faith because of the attitude of the Kurds, is entirely
unfounded.” The Minister declared, “The nine hundred Christians in the
kaza of Genc have since reverted back to their old faith and are practicing
their religion in complete peace and security.”99
It appears that the fallout of 1895 lasted a long time. On 26 April 1902 the
British Embassy had reported that twelve families amounting to seventy-ﬁve
souls in the village of C¸atal, kaza of Andırın, vilayet of Aleppo, “who had
been forced to accept Islam to save their lives during the troubles” had
applied to return to their original faith. The embassy claimed they had been pre-
vented from doing so by the local authorities who were forcing them to have
their children circumcised and to marry their daughters to Muslims.100
C O N C L U S I O N
The issue of mass conversions of Armenians is obviously linked to the whole
vexed issue of whether the massacres were ordered, inspired, or encouraged by
the sultan and his government. The question is, to what extent does this study of
mass conversions change, conﬁrm, or reject the position that Sultan
Abdu¨lhamid and his government were directly responsible for the massacres?
Franc¸ois Georgeon, in the only recent political biography of Abdu¨lhamid II,
gives a very balanced assessment. Georgeon contends that the view of the
sultan “avenging himself against the Armenians” for forcing him into
reforms that he did not want to carry out goes against “the extreme prudence
in foreign and domestic policy that he manifested during his long reign.”101
Also, the fact was that there were whole regions that escaped the massacres
through the energetic actions of some local authorities. The actual massacres
were carried out by “the Muslims of eastern Anatolia, notables, dervishes,
ulema (religious functionaries), and the s¸eyhs of Kurdish tribes.” All of these
elements were terriﬁed “by the spectre of an independent Armenia,” where
they would become immigrants (muhacir), as it happened in the Balkans.
That was why the massacres “spread like shockwaves” immediately after the
announcement of the sultan’s acceptance of the reforms. Various sources
attest that provocative sermons were preached in mosques after Friday
prayers, spreading the rumor that the reforms amounted to the granting of inde-
pendence to the Armenians.102 This would explain why many of the massacres
occurred on Fridays, although the Turkish documentation puts the onus on the
99 Ibid., 26, Tes¸rin-i Evvel 1313/8 Nov. 1897, Foreign Ministry to Sublime Porte, no. 2931.
100 BOA A.MKT MHM 654/10 13 Nisan 1318/26 Apr. 1902, Sublime Porte to Ministry of
Interior. Andırın is today the sub-prefecture of Go¨ksun in the vilayet of Mus¸. See Osmanlı Yer
Adları So¨zlu¨g˘u¨.
101 Franc¸ois Georgeon, Abdu¨lhamid II: Le sultan calife (Paris, 2003), 293.
102 Ibid., 294.
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Armenians and almost invariably states that Armenians attacked Muslims
while the men were in the mosque at Friday prayer.103 Most foreign sources
agree that local ofﬁcials like Enis Pas¸a at Diyarbekir were often involved in
aiding and abetting the massacres.104 Dragoman Fitzmaurice for his part was
convinced that the massacres occurred at a signal from the sultan: “No direct
orders had been issued . . . but clear hints had come down from Yıldız that
‘it would be desirable to give the Armenians a good lesson.’ In an Oriental
country, he said, this was all that was needed.”105
Yet, most sources agree that there is no evidence of a direct order on the part
of Abdu¨lhamid to massacre Armenians: “Although there is no direct evidence
that the sultan ordered the massacres, the timing is suspect, with the events
occurring just after the reform decree was issued.”106 It is my opinion that
Abdu¨lhamid intended to cow, decimate, and humble the Armenians, but not
to destroy them.
Robert Melson has drawn attention to the distinction that must be made
between the policies of Abdu¨lhamid and the subsequent policies of the
Young Turks: “Sultan Abdul Hamid II had no intention of exterminating the
Armenians or destroying the Armenian millet as such. The main reason why
total genocide was not perpetrated by the Ottoman regime in 1894–1896
was its commitment to Islam, to the millet system, and to restoring the old
order. Abdul Hamid was not a revolutionary. . . . The Porte was able to go
along with or to help perpetrate massacre, but it was not willing to go so far
as to destroy the Armenian millet.”107
Hu¨seyin Nazım Pas¸a stated in his memoirs, “It is a complete lie and a slander
to say that Abdu¨lhamid ordered the massacre of the Armenians.” But then,
he would—he was the minister of police.108 Franc¸ois Georgeon notes that
Abdu¨lhamid was loath to use regular army units, but this compunction
applied only to their use against the Muslim population.109 This makes
perfect sense because such violence would be perceived as the Caliph of
Islam defending Christians at the expense of Muslims.
When Said Pas¸a, ex-Foreign Minister and sometime Grand Vizier, took
refuge with the British Embassy in 1895, “ﬁrmly convinced that the Sultan
intended to deprive him of liberty if not of life,” he openly conﬁded in the
British Ambassador, “The Sultan’s complicity in the Sassoun massacres
received full conﬁrmation from him, and he quoted a statement made by His
103 Hu¨seyin Nazım Pas¸a, Ermeni Olayları Tarihi, vol. 1, 94, 100.
104 Georgeon, Abdu¨lhamid II, 294–95.
105 Berridge, Gerald Fitzmaurice, 25.
106 Taner Akc¸am, Shameful Act, 42.
107 Robert Melson, Revolution and Genocide: On the Origins of the Armenian Genocide and the
Holocaust (Chicago, 1992), 69.
108 Hu¨seyin Nazım Pas¸a, Hatıralarım, 49.
109 Georgeon, Abdu¨lhamid II, 295.
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Majesty that the Armenian question must be settled not by reform but by blood.
‘At ﬁrst’ he said, ‘I did not understand his meaning. I thought he referred to war
with a foreign Power, but I ﬁnd he meant massacre.’”110
That the massacres ceased abruptly, even if the state of terror continued,
strongly implies that they were not simply acts of spontaneous cruelty: “If
we regard the atrocities as the mere sadistic cruelty of a half-mad tyrant, or
an expression of Moslem fanaticism, [if] the massacres could be explained in
either of these two ways, there was no way of stopping them at all. Evidently,
they must be seen as deliberate acts of policy.” Abdu¨lhamid told the British
Ambassador Sir Philip Currie in 1897, “The Armenian question is ﬁnally
closed.”111
Even if most of the evidence pointing to ofﬁcial complicity or ofﬁcial inspi-
ration is circumstantial, it is also substantial. In the light of the above, how can
we contextualize the issue of mass conversions during the Hamidian mas-
sacres? The key seems to be the ofﬁcial policy that individual conversions
were permissible but that mass conversions were not to be accepted. Several
remarks can be made on this conjuncture. The ostensible reason for the
state’s refusal to accept mass conversions was that at some later date, at ﬁrst
opportunity, the Armenians would “complain to the foreigners” that they had
been forced to convert. Even if this reason is taken at face value, it still
means that it is depriving the Armenians of a last desperate measure of
defense against being massacred. The ofﬁcial documentation openly stated
on all occasions that the reason for the conversions was “fear of the Kurds”
(ekrad’dan havf ve has¸iyetleri). When an Armenian village converted, but
their conversion was not accepted ofﬁcially, they were in that very dangerous
state of limbo in which they were at the mercy of the Kurds and other Muslims
who were looking for the slightest excuse to fall upon them. To take a
cynical view, this would suit the state because on the one hand they could
claim to the observers on the spot, like the foreign consuls or missionaries
and their superiors in Istanbul, that they had nothing to do with it and the
mass conversions and previous or subsequent massacres were the result of
popular outrage that they could not control. Then again, their interest would
be served either through the Armenians becoming genuine Muslims or by
their eventual decimation by the Kurds. Also, telling Armenian potential
converts “you may convert individually once order has been restored” seems
disingenuous at best when there was a very real chance that they would not
live that long.
110 Douglas, “Britain and the Armenian Question,” 125. Douglas cites: Salisbury Papers, Christ
Church, Oxford, Currie to Salisbury, 11 Dec. 1895 (Salisbury, A/135, fols. 249–56).
111 Ibid., 132. Douglas cites: Salisbury Papers, Christ Church, Oxford, Currie to Salisbury, 28
Oct 1897 (Salisbury, A/137, fols. 145–49)
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Dragoman Fitzmaurice certainly did not nourish any illusions about the
actual conversions being the result of “free will”:
I would beg here to point out and it is a distinction upon which the Turkish authorities
may lay great stress, that the Moslems did not with axes in their hands invite the Chris-
tians to choose between the alternatives of Islam or death. They simply showed and
proved their determined resolve to massacre all Christians, and the latter, to save their
lives, accepted Islamism. It is the subtle logical distinction between objective and sub-
jective. The alternatives offered by the Mussulmans were not Islam or death, whereas the
only alternatives left to the Christians were those of death or Islam. So that the Arme-
nians, to save themselves from certain death, became Mussulmans of their own free
will, if, indeed, people under such terrible circumstances can in any way be considered
as free agents possessing a free will.112
The deliberate delay in the conversion formalities seems also reprehensible
from the standpoint of Islamic jurisprudence. In an earlier period, at least in one
instance, the S¸eyhu¨lislam’s ofﬁce ( fetvahane) had issued an ofﬁcial fetva
denouncing the negligence of ofﬁcials who declined to accept a conversion:
“If any individual from among the inﬁdels presents himself before any gover-
nor, ruler or ofﬁcer or even anybody from the humble folk, saying ‘make me a
Muslim and initiate me in the faith,’ if he was to receive the answer ‘I do not
know’ or ‘go to so and so’ this is verily the greatest of sins. . . . This delay and
neglect is against S¸eriat rulings and deserves divine retribution.”113
Indeed just what they meant by “individual” or “isolated” (mu¨nferid) conver-
sions is a moot point. Who decided on the conversion? It would seem that heads
of families would make the decision or, as in the case of the Birecik Armenians
seen above, community leaders. Howmany heads or heads of families had to be
counted for the act to qualify as an acceptable conversion? It must also be born
in mind that the various references in the documents to the Armenians “con-
verting freely and without pressure,” almost always occur right after a reference
to their converting “out of fear of the Kurds,” which puts an entirely new face
on the idea of free will. It appears that, to Hamidian ofﬁcialdom at least, fear of
recent massacres or their probable repetition amounted to free will. In at least
one case, the Armenians are said to be converting after the immediate danger
had passed because their villages had already been hit and this was held as
proof of the genuineness of the conversion. In another case the converted
Armenians are told that even if they convert they will still be responsible for
extortionist tax arrears. The frequent reference to grown men having them-
selves circumcised in what were most likely to be primitive hygienic con-
ditions, but this still not qualifying as a legitimate conversion, also seems to
point in the direction of ofﬁcial complicity. The repeated references to
112 Vice Consul Fitzmaurice to Sir P. Currie Birejik, 5 Mar. 1896, Turkey, no. 5 (1896), 3.
113 BOA. A.MKT 86/42 15 Receb 1263/24 June 1847, fetva from the Shaikh ul-Islam’s ofﬁce
regarding the breach in the procedure of conversion on the part of the kaza council of Sehirkoy and
the eyalet of Nis¸.
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Armenians “applying every day” to have their conversions recognized, to
renew their marriage wows, must surely indicate a serious degree of despera-
tion that the state was choosing to ignore. In particular, references to “natural
inclinations to convert” because of proximity to Muslims as a genuine
motive for conversion appears to be highly cynical. Open admission that Arme-
nian claims to forced conversion are baseless because if the Kurds wanted to
they would not have spared any of them, comes as close as is possible to an
ofﬁcial admission of complicity. Another striking thing is that almost all the
cases of forced conversions refer to their being the result of fear of the
Kurds; there is hardly any mention of ﬁne upstanding non-Kurdish citizens
taking part in the slaughter. The ofﬁcial attitude in relation to the abduction
of Armenian girls and women is also highly suspect. The mention of the pro-
vocation of “national feelings” if one tampered too closely with the abductors
strongly implies that some degree of ofﬁcial approval was extended to the acts
that had led to the “national feelings” becoming enﬂamed.
Many questions remain. What proportion of the converts converted back to
Apostolic Christianity? How many remained Muslims? What was their fate in
1915? Did they keep contact with their former communities? These are all pro-
blems for subsequent research. As to how the ex-Armenian Muslims “feel”
their new identity, the answer to that question will probably never be known.
T H E A R M E N I A N Q U E S T I O N I S F I N A L LY C L O S E D 371
Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0010417509000152
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Lebanese American University, on 13 Nov 2017 at 08:48:23, subject to the Cambridge
